













Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Hannagan RJ, Littvay L, Popa SA.  
Theorizing Sex Differences in Political Knowledge: Insights from a Twin Study. 




© The Women and Politics Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2014  
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X1300055X  
Date deposited:   
01/12/2017 
	   1	  
Theorizing Sex Differences in Political Knowledge: Insights from a 
Twin Study 	  Rebecca	  J.	  Hannagan*	  Northern	  Illinois	  University	  	  Levente	  Littvay	  Central	  European	  University	  	  Sebastian	  Adrian	  Popa	  Central	  European	  University	  and	  University	  of	  Mannheim	  	  	  
Abstract 
 
There is no theory that currently explains the gender gap in the psychological orientation to 
politics.  This paper is an attempt to build theory and we make use of an empirical test to 
illustrate a pattern in the gender gap in political knowledge literature.  We test for the source of 
variance in political knowledge between men and women using an ACE twin design.  We find 
that the amount of the variance in political knowledge explained by the environment is the same 
for men and women, but there is a difference in the amount of variance explained by additive 
genetic effects.  In fact, the additional variance in political knowledge among women is almost 
entirely driven by additive genetic effects.  We discuss the implications of this finding in light of 
the literature on the “gender gap” in political knowledge and our own theoretical framework.  
We recommend implementing different measures of political knowledge as well as more nuanced 
theorizing to guide gender and politics research. 
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Introduction	  It	  is	  well	  established	  that	  women	  and	  men	  differ	  in	  their	  psychological	  orientation	  to	  politics	  (Burns,	  Schlozman	  and	  Verba	  2001;	  Dolan	  2011;	  Fox	  and	  Lawless	  2004;	  Thomas	  2012).	  	  In	  addition	  to	  willingness	  to	  run	  for	  office,	  expressing	  interest	  in	  politics,	  and	  political	  efficacy,	  men	  and	  women	  tend	  to	  differ	  in	  reporting	  their	  factual	  knowledge	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  The	  authors	  are	  listed	  alphabetically	  and	  contributed	  equally	  to	  the	  manuscript.	  	  We	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Hermine	  Maes,	  Zoltán	  Fazekas,	  the	  editor,	  and	  four	  anonymous	  reviewers	  for	  their	  helpful	  feedback	  and	  suggestions	  for	  this	  manuscript	  and	  all	  the	  twins	  for	  participating	  in	  this	  study.	  The	  data	  employed	  in	  this	  project	  were	  collected	  with	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  the	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  SES-­‐0721378,	  PI:	  John	  R.	  Hibbing;	  Co-­‐PIs:	  John	  R.	  Alford,	  Lindon	  J.	  Eaves,	  Carolyn	  L.	  Funk,	  Peter	  K.	  Hatemi,	  and	  Kevin	  B.	  Smith,	  and	  with	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  Minnesota	  Twin	  Registry	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Minnesota,	  Robert	  Krueger	  and	  Matthew	  McGue,	  Directors.	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politics,	  but	  how	  do	  we	  explain	  the	  gap?	  	  This	  question	  is	  not	  merely	  important	  from	  a	  measurement	  standpoint	  (e.g.,	  Mondak	  and	  Anderson	  2004),	  but	  has	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  gendered	  political	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors.	  	  The	  gap	  can	  be	  reduced	  when	  controlling	  for	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  but	  there	  remains	  a	  residual	  when	  measuring	  knowledge	  with	  the	  scale	  most	  widely	  used.	  	  This	  paper	  aims	  at	  providing	  insight	  on	  how	  we	  think	  not	  only	  about	  measuring	  something	  like	  “political	  knowledge”	  but	  also	  how	  we	  theorize	  gendered	  political	  behavior.	  	  We	  present	  a	  behavioral	  genetic	  analysis	  of	  sex	  differences	  in	  political	  knowledge	  using	  a	  genetically	  informative	  twin	  design1	  to	  parse	  out	  the	  source	  of	  variation	  in	  knowledge.	  	  We	  do	  so	  predicated	  on	  a	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  gendered	  patterns	  in	  political	  behavior	  as	  well	  as	  findings	  from	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  psychological	  orientation	  to	  politics.	  	  We	  believe	  our	  findings	  give	  us	  insight	  on	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  current,	  and	  seemingly	  gender	  neutral,	  measures	  of	  political	  knowledge.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Behavior	  genetic	  approaches	  have	  been	  increasingly	  used	  in	  political	  science	  (e.g.,	  Alford,	  Funk	  and	  Hibbing	  2005;	  Hatemi	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Hatemi	  and	  McDermott	  2012)	  and	  have	  been	  informative	  in	  understanding	  attitudinal	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  (e.g.,	  Hatemi,	  Medland	  and	  Eaves	  2009;	  McDermott	  and	  Hatemi	  2011)	  because	  they	  explain	  the	  sources	  of	  variance	  instead	  of	  merely	  comparing	  mean	  differences.	  	  Additionally,	  political	  knowledge,	  political	  efficacy	  and	  political	  interest	  have	  been	  found	  to	  be	  highly	  heritable.	  	  But	  such	  studies	  did	  not	  explore	  potential	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  (Arceneaux,	  Johnson	  and	  Maes	  2012;	  Littvay,	  Weith	  and	  Dawes	  2012).	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A	  Socio-­Relational	  Framework	  
	   The	  study	  of	  political	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  in	  our	  discipline	  has	  historically	  tended	  to	  assume	  similarities	  between	  the	  sexes,	  even	  while	  relevant	  differences	  were	  being	  (re)discovered	  throughout	  the	  social	  sciences.	  	  In	  1982	  Gilligan	  argued	  “theories	  formerly	  considered	  to	  be	  sexually	  neutral	  in	  their	  scientific	  objectivity	  are	  found	  instead	  to	  reflect	  a	  consistent	  observational	  and	  evaluative	  bias”	  (6).	  	  Even	  prior	  to	  that,	  Chodorow	  (1978,	  167)	  suggested	  that	  girls’	  psychological	  development	  resulted	  in	  their	  unique	  experiences	  of	  individuation	  and	  relationship,	  but	  were	  not	  derivative	  of	  or	  inferior	  to	  that	  of	  boys	  –	  a	  notion	  that	  countered	  the	  male-­‐centric	  theories	  dominating	  psychoanalysis	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Different	  does	  not	  mean	  inferior,	  according	  to	  Chodorow	  and	  others,	  and	  it	  seems	  relevant	  to	  echo	  such	  sentiments	  today.	  	  The	  assumptions	  we	  make	  about	  political	  behaviors,	  and	  the	  way	  we	  go	  about	  measuring	  them	  may	  reflect	  the	  “consistent	  observational	  and	  evaluative	  bias”	  Gillian	  suggested.	  	  We	  contend	  the	  residual	  gender	  gap	  in	  political	  knowledge	  is	  an	  artifact	  of	  a	  measurement	  that	  is	  not	  gender	  neutral.	  	  The	  empirical	  test	  we	  present	  later	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  one	  way	  to	  illustrate	  our	  contention.	  In	  political	  science	  the	  measurement	  of	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  have	  proceeded	  without	  much	  reference	  to	  research	  outside	  the	  discipline	  that	  has	  identified	  potentially	  relevant	  sex	  differences.	  	  Certain	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  that	  have	  been	  theorized	  as	  epitomizing	  democratic	  citizenship	  are	  expected	  of	  both	  sexes,	  but	  should	  they	  be?	  	  As	  an	  example,	  in	  1944	  Lazarsfeld,	  Berelson,	  and	  Gaudet	  stated	  that,	  “[s]ex	  is	  the	  only	  personal	  characteristic	  which	  affects	  non-­‐voting,	  even	  if	  interest	  is	  held	  constant.	  	  Men	  are	  better	  citizens	  but	  women	  are	  more	  reasoned:	  if	  they	  are	  not	  interested,	  they	  do	  not	  vote	  …	  [a]	  man,	  however,	  is	  under	  more	  social	  pressure	  and	  will	  therefore	  go	  to	  the	  polls	  even	  if	  he	  is	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not	  ‘interested’	  in	  the	  events	  of	  the	  campaign”	  (48-­‐49).	  	  We	  think	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  colleagues	  were	  partially	  correct	  in	  their	  explanation	  that	  men	  and	  women	  perceive	  and	  engage	  politics	  differently,	  however,	  the	  pressure	  on	  men	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls	  is	  not	  the	  only	  issue.	  	  That	  we	  expect	  interest	  or	  knowledge	  to	  translate	  into	  reasoned	  action2	  seems	  gender	  neutral,	  but	  what	  do	  we	  accept	  as	  political	  knowledge	  (and	  appropriate	  civic	  action,	  for	  that	  matter)?	  Fowler	  and	  Schreiber	  (2008)	  refer	  to	  our	  human	  capacity	  for	  thinking	  about	  politics	  as	  “playground	  cognition.”	  	  They	  note	  that	  “[o]n	  the	  playground,	  we	  are	  figuring	  out	  whom	  to	  cooperate	  with	  and	  whom	  to	  avoid;	  we	  are	  cognizant	  of	  social	  hierarchy	  and	  we	  engage	  in	  coalitional	  cognition,	  knowing	  that	  alliance	  with	  one	  group	  will	  entail	  exclusion	  from	  another.	  	  Even	  at	  rest	  on	  the	  playground	  we	  are	  constantly	  monitoring	  our	  social	  environment	  and	  our	  place	  in	  it”	  (913).	  	  Going	  beyond	  our	  disciplinary	  boundaries,	  as	  Fowler	  and	  Schreiber	  do	  referencing	  genetics	  and	  neurobiology,	  may	  help	  guide	  our	  thinking	  about	  politics.	  	  Sapiro	  (2003)	  cites	  that	  “[r]elatively	  little	  research	  explores	  the	  impact	  of	  physiological	  variation	  associated	  with	  sex	  on	  politically	  relevant	  phenomena	  …	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  notion	  that	  we	  expect	  political	  knowledge	  to	  translate	  into	  reasoned	  action	  (and	  better	  citizens)	  is	  cited	  by	  the	  following:	  Bartels	  1996;	  Dahl	  1989;	  Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996;	  Downs	  1957,	  79-­‐80;	  Moore	  1987;	  Page	  and	  Shapiro	  1992;	  	  Powell	  2000;	  	  Somin	  2006;	  Sturgis	  2003.	  	  The	  linking	  of	  “knowledge”	  	  -­‐	  as	  measured	  by	  correct	  responses	  to	  a	  survey	  and	  to	  subsequent	  behavior	  such	  as	  voting	  for	  a	  candidate	  consistent	  with	  one’s	  values	  –	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  an	  erroneous	  assumption	  about	  how	  people	  make	  decisions	  in	  a	  wide	  swath	  of	  the	  literature	  linking	  attitudes	  and	  behavior	  (Druckman	  2012;	  Jost	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Lupia,	  McCubbins	  and	  Popkin	  2000	  Zaller	  and	  Feldman	  1992).	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most	  political	  psychology	  research	  involving	  gender	  focuses	  on	  socio-­‐cultural	  forces”	  (604).	  	  Motivation	  to	  attend	  to	  politics,	  for	  example,	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  explained	  merely	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  socio-­‐cultural	  gender	  role	  expectations,	  like	  the	  pressure	  men	  of	  Lazarsfeld’s	  time	  felt	  that	  drove	  them	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls	  more	  than	  women,	  but	  also	  involve	  consideration	  of	  patterns	  of	  emotionality	  in	  affiliative	  and	  avoidant	  behaviors,	  for	  example	  as	  consistent	  with	  “playground	  cognition.”	  	  	  	  	  The	  most	  basic	  expression	  of	  emotionality	  is	  the	  motivation	  to	  respond	  to	  socially	  relevant	  stimuli.	  	  Social	  contexts	  elicit	  affiliative	  and	  avoidant	  responses,	  very	  fundamentally,	  and	  people	  will	  approach	  when	  reciprocal	  capacity	  is	  signaled	  and	  avoid	  when	  it	  is	  not.	  	  Scholars	  argue	  there	  is	  form	  and	  functionality	  associated	  with	  gendered	  patterns	  of	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  and	  women	  have	  greater	  sensitivity	  to	  social	  and	  emotional	  cues	  of	  capacity	  and	  trustworthiness	  and	  tend	  to	  signal	  trustworthiness	  (e.g.,	  kindness,	  sympathy,	  integrity)	  more	  than	  men	  who	  tend	  to	  signal	  capacity	  (Geary	  2009;	  Vigil	  2009).	  	  These	  general	  patterns	  are	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  a	  long	  human	  history	  of	  men	  and	  women	  using	  different	  strategies	  to	  get	  what	  they	  need	  to	  survive	  in	  complex	  and	  changing	  social	  contexts.	  	  Further	  evidence	  of	  this	  is	  the	  unique	  perceptual,	  neuroendocrine,	  and	  expressive	  biases	  that	  underpin	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  behaviors.	  	  These	  underpinnings	  differ	  between	  men	  and	  women	  in	  various	  socio-­‐relational	  contexts	  including	  politics	  (Geary	  2009).	  	  	  	  Research	  suggests	  women’s	  greater	  prosociality	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  long	  human	  history	  of	  male-­‐biased	  philopatry,	  where	  women	  dispersed	  to	  live	  with	  non-­‐kin.	  	  Where	  women	  have	  had	  to	  be	  (or	  are	  still	  today)	  reliant	  on	  non-­‐kin	  or	  distantly	  related	  kin,	  more	  socio-­‐relational	  maintenance	  behaviors	  for	  ensuring	  reciprocity	  would	  have	  been	  (or	  are)	  
	   6	  
necessary	  (Geary	  2009;	  Hrdy	  2009;	  Low	  2000).	  	  Studies	  from	  social	  psychology	  illustrate	  women’s	  preference	  for	  particular	  social	  arrangements	  that	  facilitate	  reciprocal	  trust	  cues	  –	  women	  tend	  to	  form	  and	  maintain	  smaller	  networks	  or	  groups	  than	  men.	  	  Experiments	  from	  both	  psychology,	  experimental	  economics,	  and	  political	  science	  show	  that	  women	  are	  more	  interpersonally	  oriented,	  avoiding	  overt	  hierarchies,	  and	  men	  are	  more	  group	  oriented	  and	  gravitate	  to	  hierarchies	  (Baumeister	  and	  Sommer	  1997;	  Eckel	  and	  Grossman	  1998;	  Gariel	  and	  Gardner	  1999).	  	  Further,	  men	  tend	  to	  engage	  in	  competitive	  between-­‐group	  interactions	  more	  than	  women	  (Niederle	  and	  Vesterlund	  2007;	  Pemberton,	  Insko	  and	  Schopler	  1996;	  Van	  Vugt,	  De	  Cremer,	  and	  Janssen	  2007).	  	  These	  social	  psychological	  capacities	  are	  not	  distinct	  from	  politics,	  but	  rather	  underpin	  men	  and	  women’s	  orientation	  to	  politics.	  Those	  socio-­‐relational	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  underpin	  many	  complex	  social	  behaviors.	  	  For	  example,	  men’s	  achievement	  goals	  are	  predicated	  on	  mastery	  of	  a	  task	  and	  separating	  themselves	  from	  others	  and	  further	  directed	  at	  the	  use	  of	  status	  and	  power.	  	  Even	  if	  in	  subtle	  ways,	  if	  competition	  and	  status	  are	  cued,	  men	  will	  respond	  in	  ways	  distinct	  from	  women.	  	  Women’s	  goals,	  alternatively,	  are	  predicated	  on	  affiliative	  outcomes	  or	  setting	  themselves	  in	  harmony	  with	  others	  (Gaeddert	  1985;	  Geary	  2009).	  	  Stress	  responses	  in	  anticipation	  of	  events	  further	  reinforce	  these	  findings.	  	  Men	  produce	  greater	  stress	  response	  to	  events	  that	  display	  capacity	  (e.g.,	  public	  demonstration	  of	  intelligence)	  whereas	  women’s	  stress	  systems	  are	  more	  sensitive	  to	  social	  exclusion	  (Stroud	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  	  These	  findings	  articulate	  general	  patterns	  and,	  as	  with	  any	  trait	  or	  characteristic,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  variation	  both	  between	  and	  within	  the	  sexes	  though	  most	  of	  our	  studies	  stop	  at	  examining	  mean	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women.	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   The	  framework	  that	  we	  propose	  to	  guide	  research	  on	  gender	  and	  political	  behavior	  involves	  the	  dynamic	  interaction	  of	  individual	  physiology,	  psychology,	  and	  socio-­‐relational	  processes	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  specific	  political	  behaviors	  consistent	  with	  “playground	  cognition.”	  	  Smith	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  presented	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  influence	  that	  genes	  have	  on	  political	  attitudes.	  	  	  They	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  influence	  is	  quite	  indirect,	  and	  the	  levels	  of	  analysis	  between	  genes	  and	  behavior	  include	  relevant	  biological	  systems,	  neurological	  bases	  of	  information	  processing	  and	  cognition,	  personality	  and	  values,	  and	  ideology	  (Smith	  et	  al	  2011).3	  	  In	  short,	  genes	  “regulate	  the	  neurological	  processes	  that	  drive	  political	  and	  social	  behavior”	  (Fowler	  and	  Schreiber	  2008,	  914).	  	  This	  perspective	  suggests	  influences	  on	  individual	  behavior	  arise	  from	  both	  external	  social	  influences	  and	  internal	  psychophysiological	  processes.	  	  We	  would	  add	  that	  external	  socio-­‐relational	  contexts	  may	  influence	  men	  and	  women	  differently.	  	  Further,	  internal	  psychophysiological	  processes	  may	  operate	  differently	  in	  men	  and	  women	  in	  response	  to	  such	  social	  contexts.	  	  Their	  model	  may	  have	  been	  put	  forth	  as	  gender	  neutral,	  but	  if	  we	  want	  to	  proceed	  as	  a	  predictive	  social	  science	  (as	  opposed	  to	  one	  that	  is	  merely	  descriptive)	  sex	  differences	  must	  be	  considered	  and	  modeled	  accordingly.	  	  The	  framework	  we	  propose	  to	  guide	  our	  thinking	  about	  modeling	  sex	  differences	  adapts	  elements	  from	  Smith	  et	  al	  (2011)	  and	  is	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1.	  	  	  [Figure	  1	  about	  here]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  authors	  also	  note	  that	  even	  this	  model	  is	  overly	  simplified,	  but	  illustrates	  the	  multiple	  levels	  of	  modeling	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  undertaken	  in	  order	  to	  truly	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  genes	  on	  complex	  political	  behaviors.	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   To	  briefly	  explain	  how	  Figure	  1	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  guiding	  research	  on	  political	  behavior	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  sex	  differences,	  consider	  that	  the	  realm	  of	  understanding	  sex	  differences	  in	  political	  science	  research	  is	  within	  the	  last	  two	  boxes	  on	  the	  far	  right	  of	  the	  diagram:	  	  Political	  Ideology	  and	  Specific	  Political	  Attitudes.	  	  We	  understand	  them	  as	  deriving	  from	  the	  Environment,	  but	  typically	  neglect	  influence	  from	  the	  boxes	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  diagram	  (as	  Sapiro	  reminds	  us	  in	  the	  quote	  cited	  above).	  	  The	  puzzle	  of	  the	  knowledge	  gap,	  which	  we	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  gap	  has	  been	  empirically	  reduced	  by	  taking	  account	  of	  changes	  in	  environmental	  variables	  (e.g.,	  level	  of	  education),	  but	  what	  of	  the	  residual	  gap?	  	  Perhaps	  moving	  to	  the	  categories	  on	  the	  left	  side	  of	  the	  diagram	  can	  provide	  insight.	  	  	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  review	  the	  empirical	  findings	  to	  date	  regarding	  a	  “gender	  gap”	  in	  political	  knowledge.	  	  We	  then	  present	  an	  empirical	  test	  utilizing	  a	  twin	  study	  as	  a	  way	  to	  examine	  the	  potential	  source	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  political	  knowledge	  between	  men	  and	  women	  that	  may	  provide	  insight	  into	  what	  we	  are	  and	  are	  not	  accounting	  for	  in	  current	  measures.	  We	  conclude	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  our	  findings	  in	  light	  of	  our	  theoretical	  framework.	  
Whither	  the	  Gender	  Gap	  in	  Political	  Knowledge?	  Dolan	  (2011)	  cites,	  “That	  women	  exhibit	  lower	  levels	  of	  political	  knowledge4	  than	  men	  is	  a	  common	  and	  consistent	  finding	  in	  political	  science	  research”	  (97),	  but	  a	  series	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Political	  knowledge	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  “factual	  knowledge	  about	  institutions	  and	  process	  of	  the	  government,	  current	  economic	  issues	  and	  social	  conditions,	  the	  major	  issues	  of	  the	  day,	  and	  stands	  of	  political	  leaders	  on	  those	  issues”	  (Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996,	  1).	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studies	  have	  identified	  measurement	  nuances	  and	  intervening	  variables	  that	  greatly	  decrease	  (and	  even	  reverse)	  the	  gap.	  	  We	  argue	  here	  that	  the	  theories	  put	  forth	  to	  date	  explains	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  gap,	  but	  the	  source	  of	  the	  gap	  that	  remains	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  understood.	  	  	  The	  notion	  that	  men	  are	  more	  knowledgeable	  has	  been	  brought	  into	  question	  by	  their	  greater	  propensity	  to	  guess	  in	  response	  to	  survey	  questions	  as	  opposed	  to	  selecting	  a	  “don’t	  know”	  response	  (Mondak	  and	  Anderson	  2004).5	  	  Lizotte	  and	  Sidman	  (2009)	  found	  that	  in	  11	  of	  the	  12	  surveys	  they	  administered,	  women	  were	  1.5	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  “don’t	  know”	  response.	  	  	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  models	  accounting	  for	  the	  inclination	  to	  say	  they	  “don’t	  know”	  produce	  knowledge	  estimates	  for	  women	  that	  are	  much	  closer	  to,	  and	  sometimes	  exceed,	  the	  estimates	  for	  men.	  	  Further,	  stereotype	  threat	  produces	  relatively	  lower	  levels	  of	  reported	  political	  knowledge	  for	  women	  as	  contrasted	  with	  men	  when	  such	  threats	  are	  absent.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  survey	  was	  presented	  as	  nondiagnostic,	  and	  when	  the	  interviewer	  was	  female,	  female	  respondents	  achieved	  higher	  accuracy	  (McGlone,	  Aronson,	  and	  Kobrynowicz	  2006).	  	  Such	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  what	  we	  might	  expect	  given	  the	  response	  to	  complex	  socio-­‐relational	  contexts.	  	  When	  competition	  is	  cued,	  men	  perform	  better	  and	  women’s	  performance	  decreases.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  Mondak	  and	  Anderson	  (2004)	  article	  illustrated	  that	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  was	  largely	  a	  feature	  of	  how	  political	  knowledge	  is	  measured	  in	  survey	  instruments.	  	  In	  short,	  they	  found	  that	  men	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  guess	  on	  political	  knowledge	  questions.	  	  Guessing	  leads	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  greater	  knowledge,	  thus,	  creating	  the	  empirical	  “gap.”	  	  By	  randomly	  assigning	  “don’t	  know”	  responses,	  the	  gender	  disparity	  decreased	  by	  about	  50%.	  The	  authors,	  however,	  were	  not	  able	  to	  ascertain	  the	  source	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  gender	  gap.	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The	  ability	  to	  retain	  learned	  information,	  opportunity	  or	  access	  to	  the	  information	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  and	  motivation	  or	  interest	  in	  politics	  (Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996;	  Luskin	  1990;	  Popescu	  and	  Toka	  2009)	  have	  all	  been	  cited	  as	  important	  pieces	  of	  the	  constellation	  that	  is	  political	  knowledge,6	  and	  have	  been	  assessed	  individually	  for	  their	  specific	  role	  in	  explaining	  the	  gap.	  	  Ability	  has	  been	  operationalized	  as	  level	  of	  education	  or	  type	  of	  education	  (i.e.,	  civics).	  	  In	  most	  of	  the	  studies	  that	  take	  education	  into	  consideration	  the	  gender	  gap	  is	  largely	  reduced	  (Burns,	  Schlozman,	  and	  Verba	  2001;	  see	  also	  Lay	  2011	  for	  an	  example	  of	  knowledge	  favoring	  women	  and	  girls).	  	  Closely	  related	  to	  ability	  is	  opportunity,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  information	  in	  a	  certain	  context	  (Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996;	  Luskin	  1990;	  Popescu	  and	  Toka	  2009).	  	  Where	  women	  have	  greater	  access	  to	  political	  information	  they	  tend	  to	  do	  as	  well	  as	  men	  in	  response	  to	  knowledge	  questions	  (Burns,	  Schlozman,	  and	  Verba	  2001).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  gap	  is	  reduced	  when	  education	  and	  opportunity	  are	  controlled	  for.	  	  	  
Motivation	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  critical	  area	  in	  examining	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  political	  knowledge.	  	  Verba,	  Burns	  and	  Lehman	  Schlozman	  (1997)	  demonstrate	  that	  women	  are	  less	  politically	  interested	  than	  men,	  echoing	  Lazarsfeld	  and	  colleagues	  (1944).	  	  They	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  “engagement	  gap,”	  and	  argue	  that	  such	  gender	  differences	  seem	  to	  be	  specific	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Other	  factors,	  such	  as	  age,	  living	  in	  a	  city	  as	  opposed	  to	  living	  in	  a	  rural	  area,	  strength	  and	  direction	  of	  partisan	  attachment,	  and	  frequency	  of	  political	  discussion	  are	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  ability-­‐motivation-­‐opportunity	  triad	  and	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  political	  knowledge	  (Baum	  and	  Jamison	  2006;	  Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996,	  179;	  Luskin	  1990;	  Popa	  2013;	  Popescu	  and	  Toka	  2009;	  Zukin	  and	  Snyder	  1986).	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politics	  and	  not	  a	  result	  of	  general	  personal	  attributes.7	  	  However,	  Karp	  and	  Banducci	  (2008)	  find	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  women	  as	  candidates	  and	  office	  holders	  can	  stimulate	  political	  engagement	  among	  women	  (see	  also	  Campbell	  and	  Wolbrecht	  2006).	  	  	  Dow	  (2009)	  finds	  that	  similarly	  situated	  men	  and	  women	  (i.e.,	  controlling	  for	  SES	  [ability],	  working	  outside	  the	  home	  [opportunity],	  etc.)	  may	  invest	  the	  same	  in	  obtaining	  political	  knowledge,	  but	  men	  get	  a	  different	  return	  on	  investment	  than	  women.	  	  Using	  ANES	  data	  Dow	  finds	  that	  at	  least	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  gap	  in	  political	  knowledge	  results	  from	  differences	  in	  returns	  on	  investment	  in	  obtaining	  political	  knowledge.	  	  This	  also	  squares	  with	  why	  men	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  guess.	  	  They	  get	  a	  different	  socio-­‐relational	  “reward”	  (so	  to	  speak)	  than	  women	  would	  by	  doing	  so.	  	  We	  argue	  that	  if	  the	  “knowledge”	  men	  and	  women	  invested	  in	  was	  cuing	  something	  that	  motivated	  women	  the	  way	  the	  current	  knowledge	  questions	  appear	  to	  motivate	  men,	  this	  same	  conclusion	  could	  be	  drawn	  but	  instead	  favoring	  women.	  	  	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  happens.	  	  When	  the	  knowledge	  questions	  concern	  government	  services	  and	  programs	  (Stolle	  and	  Gidengil	  2010;	  Thomas,	  Harell	  and	  Gosselin	  2013)	  or	  on	  women’s	  representation	  in	  national	  government	  (Dolan	  2011),	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  political	  knowledge	  is	  substantially	  reduced	  to	  the	  point	  that	  women	  and	  men	  have	  similar	  levels	  of	  knowledge	  or	  the	  gap	  favors	  women.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  traditional	  way	  of	  measuring	  knowledge	  is	  tapping	  something	  that	  motivates	  men	  (both	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  information	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  but	  also	  to	  guess)	  but	  not	  as	  much	  for	  women.	  	  According	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  This	  observation	  appears	  to	  be	  empirically	  true	  for	  women	  running	  for	  office	  as	  well	  (see	  Fox	  and	  Lawless	  2004),	  and	  instead	  of	  the	  “engagement	  gap”	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “ambition	  gap.”	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to	  our	  framework	  we	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  socio-­‐relational	  benefit	  to	  knowing	  about	  how	  many	  votes	  it	  takes	  to	  overturn	  a	  Presidential	  veto,	  is	  different	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  	  As	  long	  as	  such	  questions	  are	  the	  measure	  of	  knowledge	  that	  counts	  as	  “knowing	  about	  politics,”	  women	  as	  a	  group	  are	  likely	  to	  elicit	  less	  knowledge	  than	  men	  as	  a	  group	  in	  addition	  to	  less	  efficacy.	  	  	  	  	  These	  above-­‐cited	  studies	  appear	  to	  converge	  on	  a	  common	  theme.	  	  The	  gap	  in	  political	  knowledge	  can	  be	  greatly	  reduced	  by	  accounting	  for	  ability	  and	  opportunity,	  which	  is	  addressed	  by	  theorizing	  about	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  women	  in	  society,	  but	  also	  by	  measurement	  manipulations	  such	  as	  encouraging	  non-­‐guessing,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  stereotype	  threat.	  	  We	  believe	  our	  socio-­‐relational	  framework	  assists	  in	  explaining	  why	  each	  of	  these	  manipulations	  reduce	  the	  gap.	  	  What	  seems	  to	  be	  underpinning	  the	  residual	  gap	  is	  something	  particular	  to	  the	  particular	  questions	  asked	  (as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Stolle	  and	  Gidengil	  and	  Thomas	  et	  al.	  studies).	  	  Are	  the	  seemingly	  gender-­‐neutral	  questions	  that	  measure	  political	  knowledge	  actually	  biased?	  	  We	  believe	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  empirical	  test	  suggest	  as	  much.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  we	  present	  an	  empirical	  test	  for	  the	  sources	  of	  variation	  in	  response	  to	  the	  traditional	  battery	  of	  political	  knowledge	  questions	  via	  a	  twin	  study,	  consistent	  with	  our	  socio-­‐relational	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  sex	  differences	  (recall	  Figure	  1).	  	  Twin	  studies	  have	  been	  employed	  by	  behavioral	  geneticists	  since	  the	  1970s	  to	  explore	  the	  sources	  of	  variation	  in	  social	  and	  political	  attitudes	  (Eaves	  and	  Eysenck	  1974,	  Martin	  et	  al	  1986).	  	  It	  has	  only	  been	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  that	  political	  scientists	  adopted	  this	  method	  (e.g.,	  Alford,	  Funk	  and	  Hibbing	  2005).	  	  Political	  reasoning	  (or	  thinking	  about	  politics),	  unlike	  subjects	  taught	  in	  the	  classroom	  such	  as	  mathematics	  or	  other	  matters	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involving	  complex	  reasoning,	  is	  neurologically	  more	  similar	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  reasoning.	  	  Again,	  “playground	  cognition”	  is	  a	  better	  way	  to	  conceptualize	  how	  most	  people	  think	  about	  politics	  and	  genes	  influence	  this	  reasoning.	  	  Fowler	  and	  Schreiber	  (2008)	  note	  that	  “[w]hen	  people	  …	  are	  asked	  for	  judgments	  of	  political	  issues”	  they	  utilize	  the	  same	  parts	  of	  the	  brain	  as	  when	  thinking	  about	  solving	  social	  situations;	  “such	  findings	  suggest	  that	  political	  thinking	  is	  akin	  to	  social	  cognition”	  (914).	  	  We	  take	  this	  a	  step	  further	  and	  argue	  that	  because	  what	  matters	  socially	  often	  differs	  for	  men	  and	  women,	  political	  thinking	  does	  as	  well.	  	  	  A	  twin	  study	  provides	  one	  way	  to	  examine	  the	  gender	  gap	  in	  political	  knowledge	  by	  considering	  the	  sources	  of	  individual	  variation	  on	  a	  trait	  (such	  as	  responses	  to	  a	  battery	  of	  political	  knowledge	  questions)	  instead	  of	  merely	  focusing	  on	  mean	  differences	  between	  men	  and	  women.	  	  Since	  social	  forces	  largely	  diminish	  the	  “gap,”	  or	  mean	  differences,	  our	  test	  of	  variance	  can	  look	  at	  what	  is	  driving	  the	  remaining	  discrepancies.	  	  If	  differences	  in	  variance	  is	  due	  to	  genetic	  influences,	  this	  provides	  a	  different	  path	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  residual	  gap	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  where	  discrepancies	  are	  assumed	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  environmental	  or	  societal	  factors.	  	  	  A	  twin	  study	  is	  possible	  because	  there	  are	  individuals	  who	  differ	  in	  their	  genetic	  similarity	  –	  monozygotic	  (MZ)	  twins	  who	  are	  genetically	  identical	  and	  dizygotic	  (DZ)	  twins	  who	  share	  roughly	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  genes	  transmitted	  from	  their	  parents	  	  –	  but	  who	  grow	  up	  in	  the	  same	  environment.	  	  Variation	  in	  complex	  traits	  (i.e.,	  political	  knowledge)	  can	  be	  parsed	  out	  via	  variance	  components	  modeling,	  or,	  genetic	  and	  environmental	  influences	  (Medland	  and	  Hatemi	  2009).	  	  Correlations	  can	  be	  made	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  twins	  on	  the	  trait	  of	  interest,	  in	  this	  case	  responses	  to	  the	  political	  knowledge	  questions.	  	  If	  MZ	  co-­‐
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twin	  correlations	  are	  much	  higher	  than	  those	  of	  DZ	  twin	  pairs,	  this	  suggests	  the	  presence	  of	  additive	  genetic	  influences.	  Correlations	  do	  not	  suffice,	  however.	  	  Figure	  2	  depicts	  the	  basic	  path	  model	  for	  twin	  resemblance.	  	  The	  test	  that	  remains	  is	  to	  assess	  which	  combination	  of	  additive	  genetic	  influences	  (A),	  common	  environmental	  influences	  (C),	  and	  unique	  environmental	  influences	  (E)	  best	  fit	  the	  data.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  combination	  of	  parameters	  (ACE,	  AE,	  CE,	  or	  E)	  must	  be	  determined	  to	  be	  the	  most	  parsimonious	  explanation	  for	  the	  patterns	  of	  MZ	  and	  DZ	  twin	  pair	  correlations	  (Hatemi	  et	  al.	  2011,	  12).	  	  We	  perform	  this	  analysis	  and	  report	  the	  results	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  [Insert	  Figure	  2	  about	  here]	  
Data	  and	  Methods	  The	  data	  comes	  from	  a	  study	  of	  social	  and	  political	  attitudes	  collected	  in	  2008-­‐2009	  administered	  to	  a	  sample	  of	  twins	  selected	  from	  the	  Minnesota	  Twin	  Family	  Registry.	  The	  Minnesota	  Twin	  Family	  Registry	  is	  comprised	  of	  about	  8,000	  twin	  pairs	  born	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Minnesota	  between	  1936	  and	  1955.	  	  The	  registry	  was	  compiled	  between	  approximately	  1983	  and	  1990	  (see	  Lykken	  et	  al.	  1990;	  and	  Krueger	  and	  Johnson	  2002	  for	  additional	  information	  on	  the	  Minnesota	  Twin	  Family	  Registry).	  	   The	  Minnesota	  twin	  study	  of	  social	  and	  political	  attitudes	  is	  the	  first	  twin	  study	  specifically	  devoted	  to	  the	  subject	  matter.	  	  The	  mode	  of	  data	  collection	  was	  a	  web	  survey	  that	  was	  fielded	  between	  July	  and	  December	  of	  2008	  with	  a	  supplementary	  collection	  effort	  using	  a	  self-­‐administered	  paper	  and	  pencil	  questionnaire	  between	  July	  and	  October	  of	  2009.	  	  Given	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Minnesota	  Twin	  Family	  Registry	  the	  sample	  is	  restricted	  in	  its	  age	  coverage.	  	  All	  respondents	  were	  between	  the	  age	  of	  53	  and	  61	  at	  the	  
	   15	  
time	  of	  the	  interview.	  	  Only	  same	  sex	  twin	  pairs	  were	  selected	  in	  the	  sampling	  phase.	  	  N=1349	  interviewed	  individuals	  yielded	  n=596	  matched	  twin	  pairs	  (MZ	  Males=143	  pairs,	  MZ	  Females=213	  pairs,	  DZ	  Males=86	  pairs,	  DZ	  Females=154	  pairs).8	  	  The	  sample	  also	  included	  157	  twins	  whose	  co-­‐twin	  data	  was	  missing.	  	  Item	  and	  unit-­‐missing	  data	  still	  produced	  coverage	  over	  80.8%	  in	  the	  covariance	  estimation	  for	  the	  structural	  equation	  model.	  The	  dependent	  variable,	  political	  knowledge,	  is	  operationalized	  using	  the	  5-­‐question,	  multiple	  choice	  quiz	  (this	  operationalization	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  the	  research	  cited	  above	  and	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  claiming	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  gap)	  by	  adding	  up	  correct	  responses	  adding	  up	  to	  a	  6	  point	  knowledge	  scale.	  	  Incorrect,	  ‘not	  sure’	  responses	  and	  missing	  responses	  on	  some	  the	  knowledge	  questions	  were	  marked	  as	  wrong	  and	  summed	  to	  produce	  the	  knowledge	  score.9	  	  For	  respondents	  who	  failed	  to	  fill	  out	  to	  any	  of	  the	  knowledge	  questions,	  overwhelmingly	  due	  to	  incomplete	  questionnaire	  with	  the	  knowledge	  questions	  near	  the	  end,	  we	  marked	  as	  missing.	  	  The	  questions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  	  	  
Analyses	  All	  analyses	  to	  explore	  the	  data	  were	  conducted	  with	  Mplus10	  using	  each	  individual	  (not	  pair)	  as	  an	  observation	  and	  always	  correcting	  for	  the	  non-­‐independence	  of	  twins	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Throughout	  the	  paper	  Monozygotic	  or	  identical	  twins	  will	  be	  abbreviated	  as	  MZ	  and	  Dizygotic	  or	  fraternal	  twins	  as	  DZ.	  
9	  We	  consider	  that	  “Not	  Sure”	  reflect	  a	  degree	  of	  ignorance	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  reflected	  by	  incorrect	  answers	  (see	  Luskin	  and	  Bullock	  2006;	  Sturgis,	  Allum	  and	  Smith	  2008).	  
10	  Muthen	  and	  Muthen	  2008.	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each	  other	  through	  cluster	  sampling	  correction.	  	  The	  average	  respondent	  got	  3.539	  questions	  correct	  with	  a	  variance	  of	  2.321.	  	  The	  age	  and	  sex	  corrected	  mean	  difference	  for	  MZ	  and	  DZ	  twins	  is	  -­‐0.001	  (p=0.993).	  	  Age	  and	  sex	  corrected	  variances	  are	  MZ=2.166,	  DZ=2.185	  (where	  the	  p-­‐value	  for	  the	  difference	  is	  p=0.906).	  	  Male	  and	  female	  variances	  of	  knowledge	  differ	  more	  substantially	  (male=1.607,	  female=2.513;	  male-­‐female,	  p<0.001)	  suggesting	  that	  separate	  treatment	  of	  males	  and	  females	  is	  warranted	  when	  decomposing	  the	  variance	  into	  additive	  genetic,	  common,	  and	  unique	  environmental	  effects.	  	  The	  means	  are	  also	  significantly	  different;	  women	  get	  0.765	  fewer	  questions	  correct	  (p<0.001).	  	  Despite	  the	  highly	  restricted	  variance	  of	  age	  in	  the	  sample,	  a	  year	  increase	  in	  age	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  correct	  answer	  on	  0.031	  more	  questions	  (p<0.1).	  	  This	  coefficient	  needs	  to	  be	  interpreted	  with	  caution	  ensuring	  that	  no	  inferences	  made	  outside	  of	  the	  sample’s	  age	  range	  of	  53	  and	  61.	  	  Since	  age	  is	  still	  a	  significant	  predictor,	  age	  is	  corrected	  for	  in	  subsequent	  analyses.	  	  To	  decompose	  the	  variance	  in	  political	  knowledge	  we	  use	  a	  structural	  equation	  ACE	  model.	  	  Due	  to	  space	  restrictions	  we	  offer	  only	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  model.	  	  For	  a	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  please	  see	  Medland	  and	  Hatemi	  (2009).11	  	  In	  the	  ACE	  model	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  decomposed	  into	  additive	  genetic	  (A),	  common	  environmental	  (C),	  and	  unique	  environmental	  (E)	  effects	  using	  a	  structural	  equation	  model	  that	  treats	  these	  components	  as	  latent	  variables.	  	  Given	  the	  use	  of	  a	  genetically	  informative	  twin	  sample,	  we	  know	  that	  additive	  genetic	  effects	  are	  perfectly	  correlated	  for	  MZ	  co-­‐twins	  and,	  on	  average,	  0.5	  correlated	  for	  DZ	  co-­‐twins.	  	  Common	  environment	  is	  perfectly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  We	  also	  recommend	  referring	  to	  the	  authoritative	  work	  by	  Neale	  and	  Maes	  (2004),	  
Methodology	  for	  Genetic	  Studies	  of	  Twins	  and	  Families.	  http://www.vipbg.vcu.edu/~vipbg/mx/book2004a.pdf 
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correlated	  for	  both	  MZ	  and	  DZ	  co-­‐twins	  while	  the	  unique	  environment	  is	  uncorrelated	  across	  the	  twin	  pairs.	  	  For	  a	  visual	  representation	  of	  this	  structural	  equation	  model,	  again,	  see	  Figure	  2.	  	  This	  structural	  equation	  model	  is	  estimated	  using	  maximum	  likelihood.	  	  Alternative	  models	  are	  then	  compared.	  The	  classic	  two-­‐group	  model	  where	  MZ	  twins	  constitute	  one	  of	  the	  model	  groups	  and	  the	  DZ	  twins	  constitute	  the	  other	  can	  be	  extended	  into	  a	  four-­‐group	  model	  that	  also	  separates	  the	  groups	  by	  sex.	  	  The	  classical	  two-­‐group	  model	  assumes	  equal	  additive	  genetic,	  common,	  and	  unique	  environmental	  contribution	  to	  the	  variance	  for	  both	  males	  and	  females.	  	  It	  also	  assumes	  equality	  of	  variance	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable	  for	  males	  and	  females.	  	  The	  utilization	  of	  this	  more	  complex	  four-­‐group	  model	  is	  necessary	  since	  both	  the	  means	  and	  variances	  for	  knowledge	  are	  different	  between	  sexes	  and	  therefore	  we	  expect	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  A,	  C,	  and	  E	  may	  also	  be	  different.	  Just	  like	  with	  the	  two-­‐group	  model,	  where	  certain	  parameters	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  fixed,	  and	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  more	  parsimonious	  model	  tested,	  the	  same	  is	  possible	  with	  the	  four-­‐group	  model.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  fixing	  certain	  parameters	  to	  zero,	  proportions	  or	  absolute	  sums	  of	  the	  variance	  explained	  by	  the	  different	  sources	  can	  also	  be	  equated	  between	  sexes.	  	  The	  following	  section	  presents	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  full	  and	  reduced	  models.	  
Results	  	   We	  start	  model	  fitting	  through	  comparing	  the	  four-­‐group	  saturated	  model	  that	  does	  not	  decompose	  the	  variance	  to	  the	  ACE	  components	  that	  estimates	  different	  additive	  genetic,	  common,	  and	  unique	  environmental	  effects	  for	  males	  and	  females	  separately.	  	  (See	  Table	  1	  for	  model	  fitting.)	  	  The	  p-­‐value	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  model	  fit	  is	  within	  a	  4	  decimal	  rounding	  error	  of	  1	  suggesting	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  use	  the	  ACE	  model.	  	  Since	  C	  is	  estimated	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at	  0,	  we	  move	  to	  an	  AE	  model	  that	  fixes	  the	  C	  component	  at	  0.	  	  This	  also	  does	  not	  deteriorate	  the	  fit	  significantly	  (p=0.84).	  	  We	  then	  equate	  the	  unstandardized	  A	  and	  E	  variance	  components	  across	  the	  sexes	  individually	  and	  jointly.	  	  Equation	  of	  the	  E	  component	  leads	  to	  an	  insignificant	  decrease	  in	  fit	  (p=0.0875)	  while	  fixing	  the	  A	  or	  jointly	  fixing	  the	  A	  and	  E	  components	  equal	  to	  each	  other	  across	  the	  sexes	  deteriorates	  the	  fit	  significantly	  (p<0.01	  and	  p<0.001	  respectively).	  [Insert	  Table	  1	  about	  here]	  In	  essence,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  variance	  explained	  by	  the	  environment	  (E)	  is	  the	  same	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  	  But	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  variance	  explained	  by	  additive	  genetic	  effects	  (A).	  	  The	  difference	  in	  variance	  for	  men	  and	  women	  come	  from	  additive	  genetic	  sources	  and	  not	  environmental	  sources.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  highlight	  that	  variance	  in	  political	  knowledge	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  socialization	  sources	  (C).	  	   Medland	  and	  Hatemi	  (2009)	  criticized	  model	  reduction	  for	  small	  samples	  specifically	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fixing	  a	  variance	  component	  to	  0.	  	  Their	  arguments	  could	  easily	  apply	  to	  equating	  parameter	  estimates	  across	  the	  sexes.	  	  We	  agree	  with	  Medland	  and	  Hatemi’s	  arguments	  because	  with	  small	  samples	  it	  is	  always	  more	  difficult	  to	  detect	  actual	  differences	  (between	  sexes	  or	  from	  a	  0	  estimate)	  and	  fixing	  parameters	  might	  only	  seem	  to	  work	  for	  good-­‐fitting	  models	  because	  they	  lack	  the	  power	  to	  detect	  actual	  differences.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  fixing	  components	  of	  the	  ACE	  model	  to	  0	  because	  they	  are	  not	  significant	  is	  inappropriate	  when	  the	  sample	  size	  is	  small	  and	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  significance	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  power	  and	  not	  because	  the	  effect	  is	  close	  to	  0.	  	  The	  best	  way	  to	  overcome	  this	  is	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to	  estimate	  an	  insignificant	  component	  regardless.	  	  It	  leads	  to	  less	  power	  and	  wider	  confidence	  intervals,	  but	  more	  trustworthy	  results	  especially	  with	  small	  samples.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  potential	  concerns	  we	  present	  the	  complete	  results	  for	  every	  model	  that	  is	  less	  restricted	  than	  the	  final	  best	  fitting	  model	  identified	  during	  the	  model	  fitting	  process.	  	  Based	  on	  those	  results	  depicted	  in	  Table	  2,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  no	  matter	  which	  model	  we	  run,	  we	  are	  consistently	  yielding	  similar	  results	  (although	  confidence	  intervals	  do	  get	  narrower	  with	  the	  more	  restricted	  models).	  	  Every	  parameter	  that	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  0	  in	  the	  most	  restricted	  ACE	  model	  is	  also	  significantly	  different	  from	  0	  in	  the	  least	  restricted	  model.	  	  The	  qualitative	  magnitudes	  of	  the	  parameter	  estimates	  also	  do	  not	  change	  substantially.	   [Insert	  Table	  2	  about	  here]	  	   While	  past	  studies	  within	  political	  science	  focus	  predominantly	  on	  the	  standardized	  proportion	  of	  variance	  attributed	  to	  additive	  genetic,	  common	  and	  unique	  environmental	  components,	  given	  the	  differences	  in	  total	  trait	  variance	  across	  the	  sexes	  the	  unstandardized	  components	  are	  more	  telling	  in	  our	  case.12	  	  For	  reference,	  Table	  2	  presents	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Standardized	  components	  add	  up	  to	  1	  (or	  100%),	  whereas	  unstandardized	  components	  add	  up	  to	  the	  total	  variance.	  	  In	  behavior	  genetics	  the	  use	  of	  unstandardized	  component	  is	  very	  common	  as	  it	  is	  more	  informative	  (see	  for	  example	  Neale	  and	  Maes	  2004,	  166).	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  standardized	  results	  is	  that	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  understand	  hence	  its	  popularity	  in	  political	  science	  where	  twin	  studies	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  new	  still.	  	  But	  one	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  using	  the	  standardized	  components	  is	  that	  the	  results	  are	  inaccurate	  when	  the	  variances	  are	  different	  between	  the	  groups	  studied	  (in	  our	  case	  men	  and	  women).	  	  In	  fact,	  when	  the	  variances	  are	  different	  between	  groups,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  our	  analysis,	  it	  makes	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both	  standardized	  and	  unstandardized	  results.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  variance	  unique	  environmental	  effects	  are	  responsible	  for	  are	  practically	  the	  same	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  	  There	  is	  a	  sex	  difference,	  however,	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  variance	  additive	  genetic	  effects	  are	  responsible	  for.	  	  	  In	  fact,	  additive	  genetic	  effects	  seem	  to	  drive	  the	  difference	  in	  variance	  almost	  entirely.13	  Beyond	  the	  difference	  in	  variation	  there	  is	  also	  a	  mean	  difference	  present	  between	  sexes.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  available	  information	  we	  can	  only	  speculate	  what	  contributes	  to	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  means	  but	  seeing	  that	  most	  of	  the	  people	  in	  the	  sample	  got	  all	  knowledge	  questions	  right	  serves	  as	  a	  guide.	  Since	  the	  unique	  environmental	  contributions	  between	  the	  sexes	  are	  the	  same,	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  additive	  genetic	  components	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  little	  sense	  to	  use	  the	  standardized	  results	  as	  it	  equates	  unequal	  variances	  in	  the	  process	  of	  standardization	  leading	  to	  misleading	  results.	  
13	  Sensitivity	  analysis	  showed	  that	  no	  single	  item	  drove	  this	  result.	  While	  item	  by	  item	  analysis	  was	  not	  possible	  (since	  dichotomous	  items	  do	  not	  have	  variance,	  hence	  having	  to	  equate	  men	  to	  women	  when	  using	  a	  probit	  link	  function,	  we	  did	  test	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  exclude	  one	  question	  from	  the	  scale,	  testing	  all	  combinations.	  Results	  did	  not	  show	  drastic	  variance,	  but	  this	  is	  no	  surprise	  as	  none	  of	  the	  questions	  are	  in	  line	  with	  what,	  for	  example,	  Stolle	  and	  Gidengil	  (2010)	  argue	  to	  use	  to	  minimize	  the	  gender	  differences	  in	  the	  means.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  evidence	  presented,	  we	  argue	  that	  their	  argument	  extends	  to	  the	  variance	  as	  well.	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are	  forcing	  the	  mean	  political	  knowledge	  downward	  for	  females	  in	  presence	  of	  a	  ceiling	  effect	  produced	  by	  a	  low	  number	  of	  relatively	  easy	  questions	  asked.14	  	  
Limitations	  One	  limitation	  of	  the	  ACE	  model	  is	  that	  it	  tests	  the	  impact	  of	  certain	  sources	  on	  the	  variance,	  not	  the	  mean.	  	  A	  reasonable	  question	  could	  arise:	  what	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  means	  between	  men	  and	  women?	  	  Is	  the	  difference	  in	  means	  due	  to	  genetic	  differences?	  	  We	  cannot	  definitively	  answer	  this	  question	  with	  the	  data	  we	  have	  available	  to	  us	  in	  the	  Minnesota	  Twins	  Political	  Survey.	  	  To	  pursue	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  type	  of	  question	  we	  would	  need	  to	  explore	  the	  impact	  of	  potential	  sex	  chromosomes	  (Hatemi,	  Medland	  and	  Eaves	  2009)	  or	  differential	  functioning	  of	  specific	  genotypes	  across	  men	  and	  women.	  	  	   The	  analysis	  does	  come	  with	  limitations	  provided	  by	  the	  data	  and	  assumptions	  made	  by	  the	  model.15	  	  The	  Minnesota	  Twins	  Political	  Survey	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  sources	  to	  provide	  detailed	  political	  data	  collected	  on	  a	  twin	  sample.	  	  Unfortunately	  this	  sample	  is	  heavily	  restricted	  by	  age	  and	  geography	  and	  we	  have	  little	  information	  as	  to	  how	  these	  results	  would	  generalize	  to	  other	  age	  groups	  and	  people	  from	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  country.	  	  Also,	  the	  sample	  is	  relatively	  small.	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  DZ	  co-­‐twin	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	  addition,	  we	  reanalyzed	  the	  data	  considering	  anyone	  who	  had	  a	  single	  "Not	  Sure"	  response	  to	  any	  of	  the	  knowledge	  questions	  as	  missing	  data.	  This	  only	  inflated	  the	  reported	  sex	  differences.	  	  The	  results	  we	  present	  hold	  under	  these	  circumstances	  and,	  in	  fact,	  become	  more	  pronounced	  when	  the	  difference	  between	  male	  and	  female	  heritabilities	  are	  concerned.	  
15	  The	  latter	  is	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Medland	  and	  Hatemi	  (2009),	  but	  see	  also	  Littvay	  (2012)	  for	  why	  some	  of	  these	  are	  not	  of	  substantial	  concern.	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correlation	  statistics	  might	  be	  insignificant,	  rendering	  the	  classical	  twin	  model	  unreliable.	  	  Further,	  males	  in	  the	  sample	  are	  underrepresented,	  though	  this	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  twin	  samples.	  	  Additionally,	  various	  survey	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  nonresponse	  or	  response	  biases,	  can	  also	  be	  heritable	  producing	  additional	  confounds	  to	  our	  study	  (Thompson	  et	  al	  2011,	  Littvay	  et	  al	  2013,	  Littvay	  2010)	  	   Finally,	  the	  presented	  twin	  models	  cannot	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	  	  It	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  interaction	  effects	  both	  within	  and	  across	  the	  A,	  C	  and	  E	  components	  and	  the	  best	  fitting	  AE	  model	  assumes	  that	  C	  is	  0.	  	  While	  we	  know	  that	  the	  AE	  model	  shows	  superior	  model	  fit	  statistics	  compared	  to	  the	  ACE	  model,	  with	  a	  much	  larger	  sample	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  significant	  C	  component	  would	  be	  detected	  and	  a	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  could	  be	  drawn	  fine	  tuning	  the	  exact	  proportions	  of	  contribution	  to	  the	  total	  variance.	  	  The	  omission	  of	  gene	  by	  gene	  and	  gene	  by	  environment	  interactions	  can	  also	  bias	  the	  results,	  though	  Verhulst	  and	  Hatemi	  (2013)	  suggests	  this	  bias	  is	  negligible.16	  
Discussion	  Our	  empirical	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  environment	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  source	  driving	  the	  differences,	  but	  rather	  the	  differences	  stem	  from	  variation	  driven	  by	  heritable	  factors	  when	  using	  a	  conventional	  scale	  for	  measuring	  political	  knowledge.	  	  We	  will	  address	  our	  findings	  in	  this	  section	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  First,	  we	  articulate	  what	  the	  findings	  of	  our	  analyses	  do	  and	  do	  not	  mean.	  	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  concept	  and	  subsequent	  measurement	  of	  political	  knowledge	  itself	  contains	  a	  gender	  bias	  that	  is	  tapping	  something	  dispositional	  that	  is	  driving	  the	  difference	  (i.e.,	  lesser	  variance	  for	  men	  as	  compared	  to	  women).	  	  Second,	  we	  discuss	  how	  our	  findings	  may	  further	  illuminate	  how	  researchers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  But	  see	  also	  Shultziner’s	  essay	  on	  the	  topic	  (2013).	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should	  think	  about	  and	  measure	  political	  knowledge	  (see	  Stolle	  and	  Gidengil	  2010;	  Thomas,	  Harell	  and	  Gosselin	  2013)	  and	  we	  hope	  to	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  more	  nuanced	  approaches	  to	  studying	  gender	  and	  political	  behavior.	  	  	  The	  preceding	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  variance	  explained	  by	  the	  environment	  is	  the	  same	  for	  men	  and	  women.	  	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  variance	  explained	  by	  additive	  genetic	  effects.	  	  This	  finding	  is	  potentially	  controversial	  but	  we	  want	  to	  caution	  readers	  not	  to	  interpret	  “amount	  of	  variance	  explained	  by	  additive	  genetic	  effects”	  as	  “caused	  by	  genes.”	  	  Twin	  studies	  do	  not	  test	  for	  a	  direct	  genetic	  causal	  relationship	  (recall	  Figure	  1).	  	  It	  is	  a	  tool	  to	  identify	  presence	  of	  heritability	  and,	  in	  this	  case,	  differences	  that	  may	  exist	  among	  men	  and	  women.	  	  We	  do	  this	  not	  to	  pronounce	  that	  men	  are	  “genetically	  inclined	  to	  X	  …”	  or	  “women	  are	  genetically	  inclined	  to	  Y	  …”	  	  but	  to	  illuminate	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  way	  we	  have	  been	  thinking	  about	  and	  measuring	  political	  knowledge	  might	  be	  gender	  biased	  as	  our	  test	  illustrates	  that	  the	  current	  scale	  widely	  used	  for	  measuring	  political	  knowledge	  elicits	  more	  than	  mean	  differences.	  	  It	  elicits	  greater	  variance	  for	  women,	  and	  less	  variance	  for	  men.	  	  	  	  Interpretation	  of	  our	  results	  suggests	  the	  variation	  among	  women	  is	  being	  driven	  by	  additive	  genetic	  effects	  as	  opposed	  to	  environmental	  sources,	  which	  is	  what	  the	  literature	  to	  date	  has	  pointed	  to	  as	  the	  causal	  mover	  of	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  (e.g.,	  the	  more	  education	  and	  access	  women	  have,	  the	  better	  they	  perform	  on	  the	  knowledge	  questions).	  	  We	  again	  caution	  the	  reader	  not	  to	  misinterpret	  our	  findings.	  	  It	  may	  seem	  as	  though	  we	  are	  arguing	  that	  “men	  are	  knowledgeable	  and	  women	  either	  are	  or	  are	  not.”	  	  That	  is	  too	  simplistic	  an	  interpretation	  based	  on	  our	  findings	  of	  differences	  in	  variance.	  	  To	  think	  about	  this	  in	  a	  more	  nuanced	  way,	  and	  in	  a	  way	  that	  we	  hope	  might	  inform	  future	  measurement	  of	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political	  knowledge,	  we	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  variance	  in	  political	  knowledge	  being	  
heritable.	  	  What	  could	  that	  possibly	  mean?	  	  	  A	  finding	  such	  as	  the	  one	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  raises	  an	  important	  theoretical	  question:	  Why	  would	  the	  additive	  genetic	  component	  influence	  variation	  in	  women’s	  political	  knowledge	  more	  than	  men’s?	  	  To	  respond	  to	  this	  question	  we	  draw	  on	  recent	  studies	  that	  have	  considered	  heritability	  and	  a	  gender	  gap.	  	  When	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  heritability	  between	  men	  and	  women	  on	  a	  trait	  with	  more	  variation	  in	  one	  sex	  but	  not	  the	  other,	  there	  may	  be	  adaptation	  involved	  –	  or,	  something	  in	  the	  psychological	  or	  behavioral	  trait	  that	  is	  relevant	  for	  survival	  and	  reproduction	  to	  one	  sex	  but	  not	  the	  other.	  	  Hatemi,	  Medland	  and	  Eaves	  (2009)	  cite	  that	  the	  genetic	  variation	  will	  be	  less	  for	  traits	  exposed	  to	  stronger	  selection.	  	  Evolutionary	  logic	  may	  very	  well	  predict	  lower	  variance	  on	  the	  heritable	  trait	  since	  things	  that	  matter	  most	  for	  survival	  and	  reproduction	  are	  most	  tightly	  regulated.	  	  So	  the	  key	  interpretation	  of	  this	  difference	  has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  a	  greater	  spread	  of	  political	  knowledge	  for	  women	  and	  more	  to	  do	  with	  this	  particular	  measure	  political	  knowledge	  tapping	  something	  that	  is	  particularly	  salient	  for	  men.	  	  Consistent	  with	  “playground	  cognition”	  our	  brains	  attend	  to	  those	  aspects	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life	  that	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  serve	  us	  well.	  What	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  cited	  above	  converge	  upon	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  men	  and	  women	  are	  more	  or	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  motivated	  to	  attend	  to	  various	  kinds	  of	  political	  knowledge	  given	  the	  relative	  “return	  on	  investment.”	  	  We	  suggest	  the	  “return	  on	  investment”	  can	  mean	  anything	  from	  the	  social-­‐acceptability	  of	  reporting	  you	  “don’t	  know”	  on	  a	  test	  of	  knowledge,	  being	  cued	  about	  competition	  and	  hierarchy,	  or	  the	  extent	  to	  which	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spending	  time	  learning	  one	  type	  of	  political	  knowledge	  over	  another	  is	  likely	  to	  bring	  about	  practical	  social	  and	  material	  benefits.	  	  	  Lizotte	  and	  Sidman	  (2009),	  McGlone,	  Aronson,	  and	  Kobrynowicz	  (2006),	  and	  Mondak	  and	  Anderson	  (2004)	  all	  illustrate	  differing	  forms	  of	  risk-­‐taking	  or	  risk-­‐averse	  behaviors	  and	  find	  changes	  in	  the	  knowledge	  gap	  accordingly.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  “propensity	  to	  guess”	  research,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  clues	  regarding	  political	  knowledge	  and	  the	  gender	  gap	  comes	  from	  Stolle	  and	  Gidengil	  (2010)	  who	  illustrate	  that	  “politics”	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  campaign	  horse	  races,	  the	  who’s	  who	  of	  office	  holders,	  and	  other	  civics	  quiz	  type	  questions.	  	  Politics	  is	  also	  about	  goods	  and	  services,	  access,	  and	  identifying	  contexts	  when	  one’s	  views	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  represented.17	  	  Women	  are	  as,	  if	  not	  more,	  knowledgeable	  as	  men	  about	  these	  aspects	  of	  politics	  (see	  also	  Dolan	  2011;	  Karp	  and	  Banducci	  2008).	  	  Although	  women	  are	  nearly	  as	  likely	  to	  correctly	  respond	  to	  the	  knowledge	  questions	  when	  controlling	  for	  education,	  SES,	  and	  so	  forth,	  there	  remains	  a	  gap	  that	  is	  remedied	  by	  changing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  questions.	  	  Unfortunately,	  our	  data	  does	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  run	  the	  analyses	  using	  those	  “practical”	  knowledge	  questions,18	  but	  we	  hope	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  For	  another	  treatment	  of	  this	  idea,	  see	  Hannagan	  2008a	  and	  Hannagan	  2008b.	  	  18	  Examples	  of	  “practical”	  political	  knowledge	  questions	  (from	  Thomas,	  Harell	  and	  Gosselin	  2013)	  include:	  	  “If	  someone	  is	  working	  in	  Canada	  and	  has	  to	  take	  care	  of	  a	  seriously	  ill	  relative,	  how	  many	  weeks	  of	  compassionate	  care	  benefits	  are	  paid?”	  	  and	  	  “Imagine	  someone	  is	  trying	  to	  rent	  an	  apartment	  in	  Calgary.	  If	  they	  were	  refused	  an	  apartment	  and	  thought	  it	  was	  because	  they	  were	  a	  student,	  where	  would	  be	  the	  BEST	  place	  to	  go	  to	  make	  a	  complaint?”	  	  and	  	  “If	  someone	  had	  to	  go	  to	  court	  and	  could	  not	  afford	  a	  lawyer,	  where	  would	  be	  the	  BEST	  place	  to	  go?”	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that	  providing	  our	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  why	  there	  may	  be	  differences	  and	  what	  types	  of	  questions	  may	  tap	  a	  gendered	  response	  will	  encourage	  others	  to	  further	  investigate	  this	  hypothesis.	  Based	  on	  our	  socio-­‐relational	  framework,	  men	  and	  women	  may	  attend	  to	  different	  types	  of	  information	  in	  varying	  social	  contexts	  and	  in	  response	  to	  the	  affiliative	  or	  capacity-­‐driven	  consequences.	  	  Thinking	  about	  these	  differences	  may	  assist	  in	  better	  predicting	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors.	  	  And	  returning	  to	  Gilligan,	  Chodorow	  and	  Saprio,	  such	  findings	  need	  not	  result	  in	  men’s	  focus	  of	  attention	  or	  resulting	  behaviors	  being	  more	  valid	  than	  women’s.	  	  Measuring	  “political	  knowledge”	  could	  arguably	  be	  undertaken	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways.	  	  We	  may	  understand	  politics	  to	  be	  about	  the	  operation	  of	  government	  and	  how	  power	  is	  distributed,	  but	  also	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  and	  even	  the	  relationship	  between	  citizens	  and	  government	  (e.g.,	  Thomas,	  Harell	  and	  Gosselin	  2013).	  	  We	  encourage	  the	  reader	  to	  think	  more	  broadly	  about	  the	  questions	  measuring	  political	  knowledge	  in	  their	  survey	  instruments.	  	  Political	  knowledge	  as	  presently	  measured	  in	  the	  traditional	  battery	  of	  questions	  is	  all	  about	  the	  contest,	  the	  hierarchy,	  and	  power.	  	  Politics	  so	  defined	  may	  be	  particularly	  salient	  for	  men	  because	  they	  get	  a	  greater	  socio-­‐relational	  return	  on	  investment	  for	  knowing	  about	  these	  aspects	  of	  politics	  –	  thus	  the	  lesser	  variance	  finding	  from	  our	  test.	  	  Women	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  psychological	  orientation	  to	  other	  aspects	  of	  politics,	  such	  services	  and	  policies	  impacting	  their	  communities	  and	  their	  families	  (Stolle	  and	  Gidengil	  2010;	  Thomas,	  Harell	  and	  Gosselin	  2013),	  as	  well	  as	  who	  they	  may	  look	  to	  best	  further	  their	  political	  interests.	  	  	  We	  suggest	  our	  findings	  that	  the	  additive	  genetic	  effects	  impacting	  greater	  or	  lesser	  variation	  in	  women	  and	  men’s	  responses	  to	  these	  questions	  tell	  a	  story.	  	  The	  story	  is	  that	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these	  particular	  questions	  measure	  an	  aspect	  of	  politics	  that	  resonates	  with	  men’s	  psychological	  orientation	  more	  than	  an	  aspect	  of	  politics	  that	  would	  resonate	  with	  women’s.	  	  Change	  the	  “cueing”	  of	  that	  orientation	  and	  you	  change	  knowledge	  reports	  as	  well	  as	  related	  behavior.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  our	  data,	  we	  cannot	  directly	  test	  this	  hypothesis,	  but	  we	  hope	  to	  see	  other	  scholars	  pick	  up	  where	  we	  have	  left	  off	  and	  engage	  this	  inquiry	  further.	  	   	  Politics	  is	  about	  the	  ability	  to	  identify	  and	  negotiate	  for	  what	  you	  need	  within	  the	  spheres	  of	  political	  exchange	  in	  which	  you	  operate.	  	  There	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  these	  spheres	  to	  be	  perceived	  somewhat	  differently	  by	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  for	  their	  strategies	  in	  attending	  to	  information	  to	  be	  different	  as	  well.	  	  Former	  Ambassador	  and	  Governor	  of	  Vermont	  Madeleine	  Kunin	  described	  her	  experience	  entering	  “politics”	  the	  following	  way:	  I	   was	   unknowingly	   preparing	   for	   a	   political	   life	   …	   None	   of	   the	   activities	   I	  engaged	  in	  met	  the	  definition	  of	  “political,”	  but	  they	  taught	  me	  political	  skills.	  	  The	   difference	   between	   community	   activities	   and	   political	   action	   is	   simply	  one	  of	  scale	  …	  When	  I	  was	  eventually	  elected	  to	  public	  office,	  I	  discovered	  I	  was	   far	   better	   prepared	   than	   I	   had	   anticipated.	   	   I	   had	   underestimated	   the	  enormous	  amount	  that	  I	  had	  learned	  in	  the	  community	  and	  was	  unaware	  of	  my	  ability	  to	  transfer	  my	  knowledge	  to	  public	   life	  (as	  cited	  in	  Mayhead	  and	  Marshall	  2005,	  74).	  	  She	  did	  not	  realize	  what	  she	  was	  doing	  was	  political	  or	  had	  any	  transference	  to	  “politics,”	  because	  it	  did	  not	  match	  up	  with	  the	  prevailing	  conception	  of	  political	  behavior	  and	  politics.	  	  Her	  perception	  of	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  attended	  to	  and	  her	  motivation	  to	  make	  it	  happen	  was	  political	  behavior.	  	  When	  we	  begin	  asking	  women	  (and	  men)	  about	  their	  communities	  and	  things	  that	  immediately	  matter	  for	  their	  well-­‐being,	  we	  will	  better	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  political	  knowledge	  and	  modes	  of	  citizenship	  that	  include	  many	  aspects	  of	  political	  behavior.	  	  As	  Mondak	  and	  Anderson	  (2004)	  state,	  “it	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makes	  no	  sense	  to	  seek	  out	  a	  reliable	  scale	  that	  measures	  the	  wrong	  thing	  …	  reliability	  is	  desireable	  only	  as	  a	  means	  toward	  validity,	  not	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  validity”	  (507).	  	  	  Widespread	  assumptions	  about	  male	  and	  female	  political	  behavior	  are	  ripe	  for	  reconsideration	  and	  research	  pertaining	  to	  women’s	  political	  behavioral	  repertoires	  requires	  a	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  approach.	  We	  strongly	  advocate	  for	  further	  investigations	  pertaining	  to	  gender	  differences	  in	  political	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  that	  employ	  more	  nuanced	  theoretical	  frameworks	  to	  inform	  empirical	  analyses.	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Appendix: Multiple Choice Knowledge Questions with Offered Responses 
 
1, Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not?   
(response options: The President, Congress, The Supreme Court, Not sure) 
 
2, Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts?  
(The President, Congress, The Supreme Court, Not sure)   
 
3, Which of the political parties is more conservative than the other at the national level, 
Democrats or Republicans?  (Democrats, Republicans, Not sure)  
 
4, How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential 
veto? (response options: A bare majority of 50% plus one, Two-thirds majority [67% more 
more], Three-fourths majority [75% or more], Not sure) 
 
5, What is the main duty of the U.S. Congress? (response options: To write laws, To administer 




 Female Male 















Who has the final 
responsibility to decide if 
a law is constitutional or 
not?   62.51 29.52 7.40 827 82.16 13.24 3.01 494 
Whose responsibility is it 
to nominate judges to the 
Federal Courts?  
 63.19 18.13 13.05 826 78.95 12.97 8.07 494 
Which of the political 
parties is more 
conservative than the 
other at the national level, 
Democrats or 
Republicans?   71.19 14.54 14.12 828 80.15 10.49 9.31 494 
How much of a majority 
is required for the U.S. 
Senate and House to 
override a presidential 
veto? 69.19 12.67 18.09 828 83.35 6.47 10.18 493 
What is the main duty of 
the U.S. Congress? 59.06 23.32 17.63 828 78.10 11.74 8.33 493 
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 Figure	   1:	   	   Socio-­‐Relational	   Framework	   of	   Genetic,	   Biologically	   Relevant	   Systems,	  Information	  Processing	  Bias,	  Personality/Values,	  Ideology,	  and	  Specific	  Political	  Behaviors.	  (Adapted	  from	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  2011).	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  Figure	  2:	  	  ACE	  Twin	  Design	  
	  
	  A	  –	   [A]dditive	  Genetic	  Effect,	  C	  –	   [C]ommon	  Environmental	  Effect,	   E	   –	   Unique	   [E]nvironmental	   Effect	   for	   Twin	   [1]	   and	  Twin	  [2].	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  Table	  1:	  Saturated	  and	  ACE	  model	  fit	  statistics.	  	  
Comparison to the ACE model -2LL df p-value 
4 Group ACE Model 8993.792   
4 Group AE Model C=0 8994.142 2 0.8395 
AE M=F for A 9004.226 3 0.0152 
AE M=F for E 8997.062 3 0.3518 
AE M=F for A and E 9018.944 4 0.0000 	  
Comparison to the AE model -2LL df p-value 
4 Group AE Model 8994.142   
AE M=F for A 9004.226 1 0.0015 
AE M=F for E 8997.062 1 0.0875 
AE M=F for A and E 9018.944 2 0.0000 
Best	  fitted	  model	  Bolded;	  Chi-­square	  difference	  in	  fit	  between	  the	  saturated	  model	  and	  4	  
group	  ACE	  model	  is	  insignificant	  at	  p>0.9999.	  	  
Table 2: Twin variances, co-twin covariances, correlations and A, C and E variance decomposition with 95% confidence intervalsTwin variances, 
Unstandardized age effect, co-twin covariances and unstandardized A, C and E variance decomposition with 95% confidence intervals in parenthesis '+	  p<0.1,	  *	  p<0.05,	  **	  p<0.01,	  ***	  p<0.001	  
 
 





















Saturated Model 1 1  0.499*** 0.1 0.558*** 0.325***       




















































Saturated Model 1.612 2.509 0.032+ 0.805*** 0.162 1.397*** 0.813***       


























(0.83-1.19)	   1.482 (1.22-1.75) - 0.999 (0.83-1.19) 
